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Meeting Need
NICOLE HASSOUN
Carnegie Mellon University

ABSTRACT
This paper considers the question ‘How should institutions enable people to meet their
needs in situations where there is no guarantee that all needs can be met?’ After
considering and rejecting several simple principles for meeting needs, it suggests a new
effectiveness principle that 1) gives greater weight to the needs of the less well off and 2)
gives weight to enabling a greater number of people to meet their needs. The
effectiveness principle has some advantage over the main competitors including a
principle suggested by David Miller in Principles of Social Justice. Miller argues that his
principle accounts for the existing data on individuals’ intuitions about meeting needs.
The effectiveness principle better accounts for this data. Furthermore, this paper presents
a new experiment on intuitions about meeting need that is consistent with the
effectiveness principle but not Miller’s principle.

1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you work for an aid agency helping people secure vitamin supplements from
the limited stock available. Suppose that you have to choose how to distribute 20
milligrams of vitamin among four people to help them avoid risk of illness caused by
vitamin-deprivation. If a person does not end up with a total of 20 milligrams that person
will have some risk of serious illness. Suppose you know that the more milligrams a
person has the less likely that person is to get sick and that having even a single
milligram will lower a person’s risk of disease. You are also able to figure out how much
vitamin each person is already receiving. So, after doing a few calculations, you create
the diagram below illustrating how many milligrams each person already has and needs.

18 12 6 0
Each rectangle represents a person. The dotted line denotes the level at which people can
meet their needs -- the needs threshold. The height of each rectangle shows how close a
person comes to being able to meet their needs. The first person has 18 milligrams, so
needs two milligrams to get enough vitamin. The second person has 12 milligrams, so
needs eight milligrams to get enough vitamin. The third person has six milligrams, so
1
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needs 14 milligrams to get enough vitamin. The last person has no vitamin, so needs 20
milligrams to get enough vitamin. What should you do if you cannot enable everyone to
meet their needs?
There are many things you might take into account in deciding what to do. You
might, for instance, try to maximize efficiency in helping people meet needs, help all
equally, or aid the least well off. In the example above, for instance, it might be most
efficient to help whomever you come across first. You might help all equally by helping
each person secure an equal amount of vitamin. You might aid the least well off by using
all available vitamins to help the person who needs 20 milligrams.
In different contexts, such principles might suggest different courses of action. In
some situations, they might lead institutions (and those in institutional roles) to prioritize
emergency aid over long term development assistance, health interventions over
agricultural support, or education over shelter. Alternately, these or other principles might
lead institutions to conditionalize aid to countries on their adopting good economic
policies or to aid individuals on the basis of how many disability adjusted life years they
can secure.
This paper considers the question ‘How should institutions (and those in
institutional roles) enable people to meet their needs in situations where there is no
guarantee that all needs can be met?’ It starts by considering several simple principles for
enabling people to meet needs set out in David Miller’s Principles of Social Justice. Like
Miller, it rejects these simple principles. But, this inquiry helps justify an alternative
principle that 1) gives greater weight to the needs of the less well off and 2) gives weight
to enabling a greater number of people to meet their needs. This effectiveness principle
does not provide an account of the appropriate balance between these two objectives. Nor
does it explain how institutions might address conflicts between enabling people to meet
their needs and other significant moral imperatives. The effectiveness principle does,
however, provide some practical guidance. Furthermore, it has some advantages over the
main competitors including a principle Miller advances. Miller argues that his principle
accounts for the existing data on individuals’ intuitions about meeting needs. The
effectiveness principle better accounts for this data. This paper also presents a new
experiment on intuitions about meeting need. This experiment shows that people do not
accept any of the traditional principles for meeting needs including Miller’s principle.
The new data suggests, however, that many people accept something like the
effectiveness principle. Let us start by considering a few preliminaries.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This paper does not distinguish between the different things people might need. People
might, for instance, need resources, opportunities, whatever fulfills their preferences, or
welfare. Rather, it talks generally about units of necessary goods and corresponding units
of need. One might, for instance, define units of needs (and necessary goods) using a
metric on the ability to secure some minimal amount of welfare. If one US dollar a day or
3,000 calories a week allowed a person to secure an equal amount of welfare one might,
then, specify that one US dollar and 3,000 calories are equivalent to one unit of necessary
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good for that person. So, if that person needed two US dollars a day or 6,000 calories a
week, she would have two units of need.
Individuals vary in their ability to make use of necessary goods because of factors
like age, sex, and health status. Institutions should take these differences in ability into
account. Setting these qualifications aside, this paper supposes that a given quantity of
necessary goods will alleviate an approximately equal amount of need for all people
(assuming that people start out with similar needs). This assumption allows a metric on
needs and necessary goods to be quite general. Both necessary goods and individuals’
needs become commensurable. So, suppose institutions are concerned to help people
secure food, money, and educational opportunities. They will know how much need is
satisfied by helping someone secure a particular quantity of food vs. enabling another to
secure a particular educational opportunity or amount of money. It might, for instance, be
just as good to enable 10 children to attend high school as to enable a single child to
secure food and water for a year.
The Proportionality Principle
Keeping the above preliminaries in mind, consider one simple principle institutions might
use for fulfilling need -- the proportionality principle. The proportionality principle tells
institutions to help individuals in proportion to their need. Suppose that an institution is
trying to enable two people -- Tamil and Effe -- to meet their needs. Tamil has one unit of
need. Effe has 1.5 units of need. According to the proportionality principle, the institution
should enable Effe to secure 1.5 times the amount it enables Tamil to secure. If the
institution has one unit to distribute, it would enable Tamil to secure enough resources to
alleviate .4 units of her need and Effe to secure enough resources to alleviate .6 units of
her need. The ratio .4:.6 is 1:1.5. This distribution helps Tamil and Effe secure necessary
goods in proportion to their need.
To make this concrete, suppose that Tamil needs an extra bag of rice every week
and Effe needs a bag and a half. Suppose there is one bag to distribute. The
proportionality principle tells institutions to help Tamil secure two-fifths of the bag and
Effe to secure three-fifths. This distribution would be in proportion to need since 2/5:3/5
is .4:.6 or 1:1.5.
Miller believes that that the proportionality principle does not give enough weight
to Effe’s greater need. He believes that the needs of the less well off merit greater than
proportional weight. Let us call any principle that gives more than proportional weight to
the needs of the less well off progressive. Miller does not offer an explicit justification
for adopting a progressive principle over the proportionality principle. He might,
however, object to the proportionality principle because he is concerned about equalizing
unmet need. He might think that the following consequence of the proportionality
principle is problematic. If necessary goods are always used to help people in proportion
to their need, the least well off will always need more than the better off until everyone’s
needs are met; there will be always be inequality in remaining needs. Miller’s problem
with the proportionality principle may be that it does not help equalize unmet need.
I will argue below that a concern for equality in meeting needs is misplaced; this
concern leads Miller awry. Unfortunately, I do not know of any defensible reason to
prefer the progressive principle Miller favors to the proportionality principle. Both the
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progressive principle and the proportionality principles are, however, in the subcategory
of prioritarian principles and it is possible to make a case for a prioritarian principle.
A prioritarian principle gives greater weight to helping the less well off than it
gives to helping the better off. It is possible to defend a prioritarian principle as follows.
Consider this psychological fact: Normally, a given quantity of goods brings more utility
to a person who has less of those goods than to one who has more of those goods. i This
observation holds even for those in need. People generally prefer to have a unit of
necessary good more when they have less of that good than when they have more of that
good. On a subjective theory of need (on which people’s needs are determined solely by
reference to their subjective states) we might say more need is fulfilled by enabling the
less well off to secure necessary goods.ii Furthermore, one might argue that the best
explanation of why people generally prefer to have a unit of necessary good more when
they have less of that good than when they have more of that good is this: Giving a
person a unit of necessary good usually satisfies more objective need when that person
has less of that good. So, even on an objective theory of need (on which people’s needs
are not determined solely by reference to their subjective states), it is plausible that more
need is fulfilled by helping the less well off secure necessary goods.
Even if preferences do not generally track the goodness of fulfilling objective
need, the following conclusion is independently plausible: It is often better to enable the
less well off to secure necessary goods than to enable the better off do so. This is
plausible even if everyone has unmet needs (on an objective need theory). To see why,
suppose that an institution must distribute water to those who live in a land ravaged by
drought. Everyone has an objective need for a few liters of water every week. Suppose an
institution had a liter to distribute and could either help someone who has already had a
liter or to someone who has not had any. What should it do? Unless people need two
liters to survive it is better to help someone who has not had any. Barring threshold
effects it is, normally, better to give more weight to alleviating the needs of the less well
off.iii
Exactly how much weight greater needs should get is an open question. The
above argument suggests, normally, giving enough weight to those with greater needs to
compensate for the effects of declining marginal need-satisfaction. The marginal needsatisfaction of a resource for a person is the difference an additional unit of necessary
goods will make to how much need a person has. So saying that there is declining
marginal need satisfaction means this: The marginal need satisfaction a person gets from
a unit of necessary good declines the more units of necessary good the person already
has.
Sometimes, however, institutions may be justified in giving even more weight to
helping the less well off than the amount that would maximize need fulfillment (taking
declining marginal need satisfaction into account). Suppose, for instance, that an
institution has to decide whether to help a sick child secure some pain relieving
medication or help a healthy child secure better nutrition. Suppose further that both of
these actions are equally good with respect to need fulfillment. Which should the
institution do? In informal surveys, I have found that people believe that the institution
should aid the sick child. Perhaps it is even better to help the less well off than it appears
to be given the effects of declining marginal need-fulfillment. iv So institutions may be
justified in adopting some sort of progressive principle.
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Strict Priority
The version of the progressive principle Miller considers after rejecting the
proportionality principle gives absolute priority to meeting the needs of the least well-off.
Only when everyone needs an equal amount does this strict priority principle require
helping everyone. Suppose, again, that Effe has 1.5 units of need and Tamil has one unit
of need. The strict priority principle tells institutions to distribute goods to Effe until she
is no longer the least well off. Only when Effe and Tamil both need one unit is it okay to
split the rest between them equally.
Again, to make this concrete, suppose an institution is distributing rice. Suppose,
once more, that there is one bag of rice to distribute. Effe needs 1.5 bags and Tamil needs
one bag. In this case, the institution should help Effe secure one-half a bag and then split
the rest between the two. Effe gets three-fourths of a bag and Tamil gets one-quarter of a
bag. They are both left needing three-quarters of a bag.
Unfortunately, the strict priority principle is implausible. There are two reasons
for this. First, the evidence marshaled in support of a prioritarian principle does not
recommend a strict prioritarian principle. At most, it supports a moderately progressive
prioritarian principle that gives less weight to the needs of the least well off than the strict
priority principle.v Recall the intuitions described above in favor of prioritarianism. If an
institution has to decide whether to help a sick child secure some pain relieving
medication or a healthy child secure better nutrition, most people think it should aid the
sick one even if both of these actions are equally good with respect to need fulfillment.
Most people, however, are a bit ambivalent on the point. They do not think that
institutions should aid the sick child come what may. The needs of the healthy child have
some weight and can trump the needs of the sick child at some point even if the sick child
is never as well off as the healthy one.
Furthermore, on the strict priority principle, it is not acceptable to fulfill the needs
of anyone who is not at least tied for the position of least well off.vi In many situations
this is unreasonable. In times of disaster, for instance, the policy of triage may be
justified. Triage requires helping those who have great needs but not those who need the
most first (even if the neediest could be helped).
Triage is compatible with giving more weight to greater needs. Sometimes, even
taking into account the greater needs of the least well off, it is better to help those who
are not least well-off. There are at least two cases in which triage might be justified.
First, triage may alleviate a greater amount of weighted need than helping the
least well off alleviates. Due to institutional constraints, for instance, there may be no
way to alleviate as much weighted need by helping the least well off. Suppose that there
are 12 people in need. One person has two units of need; the others have only one unit of
need each. There are two options. First, an institution might help the least well off person
secure one unit of necessary good. Alternately, it might help the other 11 people secure
one unit of necessary good each. Perhaps it is so costly to help the least well off person
that it is impossible to help the least well off and the others as well. It might be the case
that more weighted need is alleviated if the institution helps 11 people on a prioritarian
principle. This is so if, for instance, the weight given to fulfilling a unit of need for a
person equals the number of units the person needs before receiving the unit. Then,
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helping the person who needs 10 units secure one unit yields a ‘score’ of 10. Helping the
other 11 people secure one unit each yields a score of 11 (1*1 for each person). Helping
the 11 yields a higher score; doing so alleviates more weighted need than helping the
least well off. This is so even though alleviating a unit of need for the least well off
person is 10 times as good as alleviating a unit of need for any of the other people. But
even if one does not believe that this weighting schema gives enough weight to the least
well off, all weighting schemas will support triage in some cases. Sometimes institutions
can help 1,000 or even 1,000,000 with the resources they would otherwise use to help the
least well off.
Second, triage may be acceptable even if institutions can alleviate an equal (or
even greater) amount of weighted need by helping the least well off. Intuitively, it may be
best not to help the least well off even when the greatest amount of weighted need will be
alleviated by doing so. This does not mean that the greater needs of the least well off are
not given sufficient weight. It just means that fulfilling the greatest amount of weighted
need is not all that matters. If institutions can help a much greater number by ignoring the
needs of the least well off, it may sometimes be acceptable for them to help the better off
even though they can alleviate more need by helping the worse-off.
The prioritarian does not share this intuition. She believes it is only better to help
a greater number of people than to help the least well off when this alleviates the most
weighted need. There are two ways the prioritarian may object to any case that is
supposed to show that triage can be acceptable when it does not alleviate the most
weighted need. First, she may object to the weighting schema used in the case because
she thinks it gives too much weight to helping the less well off. Second, she may accept
the weighting schema but deny the intuition that triage is acceptable in the case.
It is, thus, easier to show that prioritarianism is unintuitive if the prioritarian
agrees to some particular weighting schema first (it does not matter which one). We can
then show that this weighting schema will, in some cases, lead to quite unintuitive results;
any weighting schema will suggest that an arbitrarily large number of the better off’s
(arbitrarily large) needs should, in some cases, be ignored to help the least well off. Let
us suppose then that the prioritarian thinks that institutions should distribute in proportion
to need weighting the amount given to alleviating a unit of each person’s need by the
amount that person starts off needing as described above. The means of constructing
counter examples to prioritarianism based on triage will become clear via the examples
below.
To motivate the weighting schema described above consider a simple case:
Suppose that we must choose how to distribute two units of necessary good between 10
people. Suppose that Tamil is the worst-off and needs three units of necessary good,
while the other people only need one unit each. In this case, alleviating the first unit of
Tamil’s need yields a score of three, alleviating the second unit of Tamil’s need yields a
score of two, and alleviating the last unit of Tamil’s need yields a score of one.
Alleviating a unit of any other person’s need yields a score of one. So, it is just as good to
alleviate one unit of Tamil’s need as to alleviate three others’ needs. It is just as good to
alleviate all of Tamil’s need as it is to alleviate six others’ needs. Enabling Tamil to
secure a single unit would be better than helping two other people secure a single unit
each. Supposing the prioritarian finds this intuitive enough, we can show that it has
unintuitive consequences in some cases. This weighting schema might suggest that an
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arbitrarily large number of the better off’s (arbitrarily large) needs should be ignored to
help the least well off. Consider the following example. Suppose that an institution must
choose how to distribute 100 units of necessary good between 200 people. Suppose that
Tamil is the worst-off and needs 100 units of necessary good, the other people only need
one unit. Weighting the amount given to each person by that person’s need would tell us
that alleviating the first unit of Tamil’s need is 100 times as good as alleviating any other
person’s need (100*1 = 100(1*1)). Similarly, alleviating the second unit of Tamil’s need
would be 99 times as good as alleviating any other person’s need. Helping Tamil secure a
single unit, however, would be better than helping 99 other people secure a single unit
each. If the prioritarian does not think this is unintuitive, we can create similar cases
where this weighting schema suggests neglecting the needs of thousands or millions to
help a single poorly-off person. Simply by multiplying the needs in the example above by
any constant we can also make the amount that the better off need in the example
arbitrarily large. Triage is sometimes required even when it does not alleviate the greatest
amount of weighted need.
Perhaps the prioritarian could respond that this weighting schema gives too much
weight to the needs of the least well off; she might think that the needs of each should be
weighted by only a fraction of their need. Such alternative weighting schemas, however,
will lead to equally unintuitive cases. (I leave it to the skeptical reader to experiment with
constructing such cases along the lines above.) In fact, I can think of no straight-forward
weighting schema that is not subject to such counter-examples where, intuitively, it is
better to meet the needs of a greater number than to maximize the amount of weighted
need fulfillment.
So far we have adopted the simplifying assumption that a unit of necessary good
fulfills an approximately equal amount of need for all people (assuming that these people
start out with similar needs). The intuition that triage is sometimes required is
strengthened, however, if some people are inefficient users of necessary goods. Suppose,
for instance, an institution must decide how to distribute 100 units of necessary goods
between a hundred people. Suppose that one person needs 10 units and the other 99 need
five units each. It might seem reasonable to help everyone just a little but to help the least
well off secure more. Suppose we specify, however, that to alleviate one unit of need for
the least well it would take 100 units of necessary goods while one unit of necessary good
will alleviate one unit of need for someone who is better off. It, then, seems much more
reasonable to help only the better off.
Triage might be justified in many ways. A good justification will leave open the
possibility that triage may be justified even if it does not alleviate the greatest amount of
weighted needs. The principle I prefer is this: Institutions should try to help as many
people as possible meet their needs.vii In some situations a concern for helping as many
people as possible may outweigh a concern to help the least well off.
The principle that institutions should try to help as many people as possible meet
their needs expresses a concern for persons. Institutions should try to help people meet
their needs because people merit respect as separate individuals. viii If persons matter,
institutions should not just be concerned about fulfilling as much need as possible; they
should be concerned about helping each person. The fact that some have greater needs
cannot always trump the fact that there are others in need.
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Finally, the fact that the case for triage is stronger where many people have dire
needs supports the principle that institutions should try to help as many people as possible
meet their needs.ix It is usually less justifiable to help the least well off when doing so
prevents an institution from helping 100 people than when doing so prevents an
institution from helping 10 people. Ceteris paribus, institutions should try to help as
many people as possible meet their needs.
There are other principles that might explain why triage is justifiable. It may, for
instance, only be better to help a greater number of people in emergency situations.
Alternately, helping the greater number may have declining marginal importance. The
alternatives are implausible. Even when there is not an emergency, triage may sometimes
be required. At least the examples we gave above to motivate these kinds of decisions did
not mention emergencies. Futhermore, it is not clear why helping the greater number
would have declining marginal importance. At least, the principle that each person merits
respect as a separate individual tells against this view.
3. EFFECTIVENESS
If the previous section’s arguments are correct, a good principle for meeting need should
judge policies by their performance on two criteria. First, how many people they help.
Second, their efficacy in alleviating weighted need where more (finite) weight is given to
fulfilling the needs of those who are worse-off.x Let us call the principle that embodies
these criteria the effectiveness principle. On this principle, a situation is, ceteris paribus,
better if it contains less weighted need or helps more people.
To apply the effectiveness principle, institutions might follow this procedure:
First, rank the possible policies from best to worst according to how much weighted need
they alleviate. Second, rank the possible policies from best to worst according to the
number of people they help. Third, for each policy, combine its ranking in terms of how
much weighted need it alleviates with its ranking for how many people it helps to yield
its final score.xi Choose fairly between those policies that have the largest score.xii
Consider how the effectiveness principle will work in the simplest case where
each part of the principle has the same implication. Suppose that there are two equally
needy people. Suppose that an institution can either help one person secure two units of
some good or help each secure one unit. Helping each secure one unit helps as many
people as possible. Because the people are equally poor, it is better to alleviate the first
unit of a person’s need than to alleviate the second unit. So, helping each person secure
one unit of necessary goods also alleviates the most weighted need. The effectiveness
principle, thus, suggests helping each secure one unit.
Now consider a simple case where tradeoffs may need to be made. Suppose,
again, that there are two needy people and that an institution must choose whether to help
one person secure two units of necessary good or to help both secure one unit of
necessary good. Suppose, however, that one person needs more than the other. In such
hard cases, a concern for helping as many people as possible is weighed against a concern
for alleviating the most weighted need possible. What the effectiveness principle will
suggest depends on the relative importance of the two parts of the principle. If it is better
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to help the least well off than to help both people, the effectiveness principle will tell
institutions to help the less well off; otherwise it will suggest helping both.
We have not specified how much weight each part of the effectiveness principle
has. So, one may worry about whether we have made much progress in deciding how to
fulfill need. Perhaps the principle provides no practical or theoretical guidance. Perhaps it
provides no real advantage over the main competitors.
This worry is not well-founded. The effectiveness principle has some policy
implications. Consider how institutions might use the effectiveness principle to evaluate
actual policies. Development agencies like Oxfam and the World Bank try to reduce
poverty. They have limited resources. Sometimes such programs only try to maximize the
number of people helped without taking into account the greater importance of meeting
the needs of the least well off. In such cases, the effectiveness principle will probably
suggest altering the programs so that they fulfill more weighted need. It is important to
try to help as many people as possible. It is also important to give enough weight to
helping those who are worse-off.
Or consider what the effectiveness principle says in another realistic example.
Suppose an institution has a limited budget for helping people in a particular region
secure either vitamin A or vitamin D, or both. Vitamin A deficiency results from
malnutrition which, we can suppose, only affects the least well off. Vitamin D can be
absorbed from the sun. Suppose that the least well off happen to be farmers who work
outside and so have enough vitamin D. Suppose that helping the least well off secure
vitamin A maximizes the amount of weighted need the institution alleviates. Suppose
helping the relatively better off secure vitamin D helps a greater number of people meet
their needs but does not help the least well off. The effectiveness principle tells the
institution to help some people secure vitamin A and some secure vitamin D. After all,
institutions must give some weight to meeting more weighted need and some to helping a
greater number of people. Depending on the relative weights of the considerations,
however, different versions of the principle will tell the institution to help people secure
more of one vitamin than the other.
We can also eliminate some justifications for particular policies using the
effectiveness principle. If, for instance, one believes that free trade is the best way to
enable people to meet their needs, one cannot say that this is because the free market will
most efficiently fulfill need, that it will help all meet their needs equally, or that it will
fulfill the most need for the least well off group. One must argue that the free market
strikes an appropriate balance between fulfilling the most weighted need possible and
helping the greatest number of people meet their needs.
It would be nice if it were possible to say more about how to resolve conflicts
between the two parts of the effectiveness principle. One way of doing so is to figure out
what kinds of principles well informed and appropriately impartial people (perhaps
placed in something like an original position) would accept. xiii This paper will say a bit
more about how this project might be carried out below. It might, however, be impossible
to say much that is plausible about this issue at a completely general level. Furthermore,
the absence of a complete account may not be problematic. We cannot ignore the need
for judgment and sensitivity to changing contexts. A little humility may be better than a
lot of precision.
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So far, we have shown that the effectiveness principle has some advantages over
competing principles including those that suggest maximizing need fulfillment, fulfilling
everyone’s needs equally, the difference principle, the prioritarian principle, and the
proportionality principle. None of these competing principles both give more weight to
the needs of the less well off and give weight to helping a greater number of people. On
the effectiveness principle it is good to try to help as many people as possible meet their
needs.xiv It is also good to give more weight to the needs of those who are worse-off. So,
the effectiveness principle gives more weight to the needs of the less well off and allows
triage in some cases.
There are, however, other competing principles. In what follows we will, thus,
consider one of these competitors – David Miller’s principle for need fulfillment. This
inquiry is important because Miller’s principle is the only alternative to the effectiveness
principle that I am aware of designed explicitly as a principle of need satisfaction. It is
also the strongest remaining competitor. So, if the problems with Miller’s principle
cannot be overcome and the effectiveness principle can avoid them, the effectiveness
principle should be, tentatively, accepted.
4. MILLER’S PRINCIPLE
Like the effectiveness principle, Miller’s principle avoids the problems with the strict
priority and proportionality principles. Miller believes, however, that a good principle
should embody a commitment to equality in meeting needs. He rejects a principle
motivated in a similar way to the effectiveness principle because it does not take
inequality into account.
Miller measures equality by summing the gaps (in resources, preference
satisfaction, opportunities, welfare, or whatever) between each pair of individuals in a
situation.xv ‘Whichever distribution yields the lowest sum total of difference is judged to
be the most equal and therefore, in this context, the fairest.’xvi Miller then adds the total
amount of remaining need to this inequality to give a score for need improvement. Lower
scores indicate less remaining need and/or inequality – they are better. If we assume, with
Miller, that institutions have reason to bring about situations with lower scores, his
principle tells institutions how to fulfill needs.
To see how his principle works, consider the following diagram:

ABCDEFG
Recall that each rectangle represents a person. The dotted line denotes the level at which
people can meet their needs -- the needs threshold. The height of each rectangle shows
how close a person comes to being able to meet their needs. Suppose that all individuals
need two units of some necessary goods. Suppose A has two units of need, B, C, D, E
and F have one unit of need, and G can meet her needs. There is a gap of one unit
between A’s level and the level of B-F, a two unit gap between the levels of A and G, and
a gap of one unit between the level of B-F and the level of G. Adding these gaps together
10
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gives us 12 units total inequality. The remaining need is the sum of the amounts by which
A-F fall below the threshold or, in this case, seven. Hence, Miller’s principle gives this
situation a score of 19.
5. PROBLEMS WITH MILLER’S PRINCIPLE
Leveling Down
Unfortunately, Miller’s principle has some unintuitive consequences. One problem with
his principle is that it is subject to the leveling down objection. A principle is subject to
the leveling down objection if it entails that equality can be increased by lowering some
people’s welfare, preference satisfaction, opportunities, or resources even if this benefits
no one. To see how Miller’s principle is subject to the leveling down objection consider
the situation from above:

ABCDEFG
Recall that Miller’s principle gives this situation a score of 19. Now suppose that an
institution brings B-G down to A’s level.

ABCDE FG
There is no inequality in this situation and seven people each need two units. So, the
inequality measure of need in this situation is 14. Because 14 is less than 19, bringing BG down to A’s level is a good move on Miller’s principle.
Miller recognizes this unintuitive consequence of his principle. He tries to
motivate its acceptance with an example. In a fuel shortage, he says, it may be acceptable
to throw some fuel away rather than help a few people secure more fuel than the rest.xvii
I do not believe this response will do. Miller’s principle might entail that
institutions should take necessary goods from the needy or impoverish everyone, even if
this benefits no one. This is unacceptable. At least, this is unacceptable for an account of
how institutions should fulfill needs; need cannot be fulfilled by reducing the amount that
some have when this benefits no one.
Perhaps because Miller does not really want to bite the bullet on this point, he
tries to avoid this problem by amending his principle in a few ways. First, he adds a
concern for satisfying as many needs as possible to his principle. This may help avoid
leveling down in some cases. It does not, however, solve the problem in the case above if
we specify that no more need can be satisfied in the original situation. xviii Maybe because
he realizes that his first proposal will not allow his principle to avoid the leveling down

11

Meeting Need 12

objection completely, Miller offers another proposal. He suggests using a theory of
equality that is not subject to the leveling down objection in calculating inequality.
Unfortunately, Miller does not provide such a theory nor explain how we might find one.
A good principle for need fulfillment should not tell institutions that it is good to increase
the amount some need if this does not decrease the amount others need. I have tried to
come up with a theory that avoids leveling down using Larry Temkin’s work in
Inequality but it is not as easy as Miller supposes to find such a theory. xix Since I cannot
prove that it is impossible for Miller’s theory to avoid the leveling down problem,
however, let us consider another problem with Miller’s principle.
Sensitivity to Irrelevant Factors
Miller’s principle is sensitive to irrelevant factors. Consider an illustration. Once again
this is the initial situation:

ABCDEFG
Suppose that an institution can either reduce A’s need by one unit or reduce each of B-F’s
needs by one unit. Action one brings A up to the level of B-F. Action two brings B-F up
to G’s level but leaves A at her current level. If the institution does action one, the
resulting situation looks like this:

ABCDEFG
The inequality in this situation is six. The remaining need is six. So, Miller’s principle
gives this situation a score of 12. If the institution does action two, this is the situation:

ABCDEFG
The inequality here is 12. Remaining need is two. So, the score in this situation is 14.
Since 14 is greater than 12, Miller’s principle suggests doing action one. When the initial
situation is slightly modified, however, Miller’s principle returns a different result.
Suppose that the initial situation contains extra people H, I, J, and K who are all able to
meet their needs. This is the initial situation:
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A B C D E FG H I J K
There are seven units of need in this situation. There are forty units of inequality. Miller’s
principle, thus, gives this situation a score of forty-seven. If the institution does action
one, reducing A’s need by one unit, the resulting situation looks like this:

ABCDEFGHI J K
Inequality is 30. Remaining need is six. So, Miller’s principle gives this situation a score
of 36. If the institution does action two, this is the result:

ABCDEFGHI J K
Inequality is two. Remaining need is 20. So, the score for this situation is 22. Since 22 is
less than 36 Miller’s principle requires action two. On Miller’s principle, whose needs
institutions should meet depends on how many people there are who are already able to
meet their needs. This is unintuitive.
Miller recognizes this strange consequence of his principle. Hence, he asserts that
justice requires considering ‘the relative position of everyone falling within the universe
of distribution. We should assess not merely the claims of A vis-à-vis B, C, and D, but
the claims of each of them against G, H, I, and so on.’xx Miller believes that justice
requires equality and institutions need to take equality into account in meeting needs. He
tries to justify this concern for equality before setting out his account. Let us consider
whether his justification can compensate for the unintuitive consequences of including
this concern in a principle about how to meet need. If there is no reason to believe a good
principle for meeting need has to embody a concern for equality, there is reason to accept
the effectiveness principle. It avoids the problems we have canvassed for Miller’s
principle (see Appendix I) as well as the others we have considered.xxi
Equality
Miller believes that we should aim for reflective equilibrium in moral theorizing; good
theories should account for our settled intuitions.xxii He thinks that experimental evidence
can get at our settled intuitions. He, thus, provides the results of a few experiments to
show that ‘people will aim to equalize degrees of unmet need, which means distributing
in favor of those in greater need until they are brought up to the same level as others.’xxiii

13

Meeting Need 14

Though this paper will argue below that the experimental evidence does not support
Miller’s principle let us first consider Miller’s methodology.
It is not clear when appealing to intuitions is appropriate in ethical theory. There
are different views on the matter. Some believe that an author need only account for his
or her own intuitions. xxiv Others only believe that the intuitions of the philosophical
community matter. Still others agree with Miller that good theories will rely upon ‘folk’
intuitions shared by all (or at least those not corrupted by too much philosophical theory).
Philosophers should probably be concerned about the intuitions of different people for
different purposes.xxv Some philosophers (or most), having thought about certain
philosophical issues, may have better intuitions than the philosophically uninitiated on
these philosophical topics. It may be obvious to ethicists (but not to others) that accepting
a particular proposition on the basis of intuition will require one to accept other
propositions that have more unintuitive consequences. Ethicists, for instance, may be less
likely than others to say morality is reducible to the law because they realize that this will
commit them to the view that slaveholders in the antebellum Southern United States were
acting morally. Sometimes, however, it is more plausible that philosophers’ intuitions
about particular cases have been corrupted by their other theoretical commitments. Those
who believe that there are only quiddities, for instance, might not think that there are
individuals who can act well or poorly. What intuitions matter probably also depends a
bit on what one is trying to show and to whom. If one is involved in a purely
philosophical debate on a particular point appealing to philosopher’s intuitions on that
point may be sufficient. Here we are involved in a much broader debate about how
institutions should fulfill need. In the absence of reason to think some people’s intuitions
matter more than others’ it seems reasonable to appeal to empirical evidence regarding
folk intuitions here. We must just remain open to revising our results if it turns out that
some people’s intuitions about meeting need are better than others’.
It is worth considering, then, the experimental evidence Miller cites. In one of
these experiments, ‘subjects were asked to divide a monetary reward between two
students who had contributed equally to a common task; one of the students was
described as needing extra money to buy books for a course.’xxvi The students were
described as friendly and like-minded. Some participants suggested that the reward be
divided equally between the students. Most participants, however, wanted to give the
needy student enough to buy the textbooks before splitting the rest equally.xxvii
Unfortunately, it is hard to see how this experiment shows that people care about
equality in meeting needs. The evidence seems to support the hypothesis that in some
situations people will try to help others meet their needs before distributing unnecessary
goods equally. Had the students needed different amounts, it is not clear how participants
would have distributed the reward. We need more evidence to justify the kind of
connection between need fulfillment and equality that Miller implicitly relies upon.
Another experiment Miller mentions tells us more. Miller reports Norman
Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer’s experiment to imitate a Rawlsian original position.
Frohlich and Oppenheimer asked participants to choose the rules of remuneration for
work that participants then completed. Despite variation between participants, people
generally choose to maximize the average income level subject to a floor constraint.
These preferences were stable over time. Because most people tried to provide a flat
minimum for everyone, Miller concludes that they disregard differential need.xxviii Why
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provide an equal minimal income floor for individuals if people are likely to need
different amounts of income?xxix Miller says participants are balancing a concern for
giving people their just deserts against a concern for need fulfillment.
Unfortunately, this explanation is not sufficient. The results just show that people
are concerned about need, not that ‘people will aim to equalize degrees of unmet need.’ xxx
Miller never justifies this connection between need fulfillment and equality that he
implicitly relies upon. One might even make the case that Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s
experiment shows that most people are not concerned about equality at all. Gillian Brock
argues, for instance, that this experiment shows that people only care that everyone has
enough to meet their needs.xxxi
Even if this is wrong, however, it seems that we need more evidence to come to
any solid conclusions about what people care about in meeting needs. Perhaps most
people do accept Miller’s principle. Maybe most people are completely egalitarian.
Maybe they accept some of the simple principles we have rejected. Maybe they even
accept the effectiveness principle. Unfortunately, the empirical literature on distributive
justice is not too helpful in arbitrating between these different theories. One reason for
this is that the literature does not address meeting needs in particular. Most of the
experimental data focuses on the difference principle.
To address this problem, I designed a new experiment intended to see what
principles appropriately impartial people think institutions should use for meeting
needs.xxxii Participants were asked the question with which this paper started about how to
distribute vitamins to four people falling below the 20 milligram line. Recall that this was
the initial situation:

18 12 6 0
The participants were then asked to rank four possible distributions. Option 1 gave eight
milligrams to the last person (who originally had zero milligrams and needed 20). This
was the result of this distribution:

18 12 6 8
Option 2 gave two milligrams to each person. This was the result:

20 14 8 2
Option 3 embodied a roughly utilitarian principle giving nine milligrams to the third
person (who had six milligrams and needed 14). This was the result:
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18 12 15 0
Option 4 embodied a plausible interpretation of the strict priority principle giving seven
milligrams to the last person (who had zero milligrams and needed 20) and one milligram
to the third person (who has six milligrams and needed 14). This was the result:

18 12 7 7
This was the distribution of rankings:

FIGURE 1. Experimental Results
Out of 33 participants, 12 ranked the options in the following order: 4, 2, 1, 3. A
significant number also chose 4, 1, 3, 2. xxxiii Miller would choose 2, 4, 3, 1. Only three
people chose Miller’s ranking. This is not a significantly different number than the
number one would expect to choose this ranking if people were picking the rankings
randomly.xxxiv Obviously, the data do not support Miller’s principle.
The data instead seem to support the strict priority principle. The fact that 12 out
of 33 chose the ranking 4, 2, 1, 3 is significant. xxxv So, one might wonder whether the data
does not at the same time undercut the case for the effectiveness principle. This is not so.
Because the experiment was designed to do many things, it is only capable of telling us
whether the hypothesis that people accept the effectiveness principle is falsified. If
participants ranked Option 1 ahead of Option 4 then they were not accepting the
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effectiveness principle. After all, comparing Option 1 and Option 4 one can see that
Option 1 does not help the least well off (once the 4 th person has more than the 3rd) or
help as many people as possible. However, 23 out of 31 participants ranked Option 4
before Option 1 (though some of these people did not choose 4, 2, 1, 3). On average,
Option 4 is preferred to Option 1.xxxvi
One might point out that it is hard to falsify the claim that people are accepting
the effectiveness principle. Only six out of 24 combinations of orderings can falsify the
claim that people are accepting the principle.xxxvii
I actually take this to be a reason to believe that the effectiveness principle is
strong. The effectiveness principle has a great deal of explanatory power. Different
weightings on its constituent principles can explain why people chose to distribute
necessary goods in different ways. It is hard to falsify the claim that people are accepting
the effectiveness principle but it is possible. Were there no preference for a version of the
effectiveness principle we would expect only one-quarter of participants to rank Option 4
before Option 1, but about three quarters of participants ranked this option first. The
claim that most people are accepting the effectiveness principle is plausible.
One might counter that it is hard to show that people do not accept the
effectiveness principle only because the principle is vague. The effectiveness principle
contains weighted parameters but does not provide the weights; it does not tell us how
much weight to give to the needs of the least well off or to helping additional people.
Perhaps there is something to this objection but the effectiveness principle is as
definite as many other principles about how we should meet needs. Prioritarianism, for
instance, does not tell us how much weight to assign to its parameters. Prioritarianism
does not tell us how much weight to give to the needs of the less well off vs. the needs of
the better off.
There is certainly room for further experimentation to figure out how most people
weigh the different parts of the effectiveness principle. Hopefully, however, this paper
has done enough to motivate this inquiry. Furthermore, we now have enough information
to say that most people do not accept Miller’s principle. A good principle for need
fulfillment does not have to embody a concern for equality.
6. CONCLUSION
Many people believe that institutions should help people meet their needs. For those that
accept this conclusion there is a pressing question: How should institutions decide
between different ways of fulfilling needs in situations where there is no guarantee that
all needs can be met and where no special obligations obtain? After considering and
rejecting several simple principles for meeting need, this paper examined a recent
proposal by David Miller. It argued that the concern for equality embodied in Miller's
principle was misplaced. Rather, this paper suggested a new effectiveness principle for
fulfilling need. Certainly, more work is necessary to fully cash out the details of this
principle. And, institutions cannot shut their eyes to morally relevant features of the real
world that might lead them to different conclusions about what to do in different cases.
Still, the effectiveness principle provides institutions with a useful starting point for
meeting needs.xxxviii
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APPENDIX I: AVOIDING THE PROBLEMS WITH MILLER’S PRINCIPLE
Recall that Miller’s principle had an unintuitive consequence. It entailed that whose
needs it is best to meet depends on the number of people in the world who can already
meet their needs. The effectiveness principle avoids this problem. Suppose that the
weight given to each extra unit of need doubles. Suppose that helping an extra person is
just as good as removing one extra unit of need. Now consider a case where Tamil has
one unit of need and Effe has two units of need. On this version of the effectiveness
principle, it is twice as good to reduce Effe’s need by one unit as it is to reduce Tamil’s
need by one unit. Once Effe only needs one unit, it is equally good to help either Effe or
Tamil. It is better to help both by reducing their need to .5 units each than to reduce the
need of either alone.
Consider what this version of the effectiveness principle recommends in the cases
that caused problems for Miller’s principle. Recall, the initial situation:

ABCDEFG
A needs two units to reach the threshold, B-F need one unit to reach the threshold, and G
can meet her needs. Here is how we calculate the weighted need in this situation using
this effectiveness principle: Three units of weighted need for A (one for her first unit and
two for her second unit of need) plus one unit of weighted need for B-F, equals eight
units of weighted need.
If an institution must either do action one relieving a unit of A’s need or action
two alleviating a unit of need for each of B-F, it should do action two. If it does action
one, this is the resulting situation:

ABCDEFG
A-F are each left with one unit of weighted need so there are six units of weighted need
total. If it does action two, this is the result:

ABCDEFG
There are three units of weighted need left. Three units are less than six. So, it is clear
that action two is better than action one, even before taking into account the fact that
more people are helped by doing action two.
This recommendation does not change if the initial situation contains additional
people H, I, J and K (who are all able to meet their needs):
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ABCDE FGHI JK
Again there are three units of weighted need for A, (one for her first unit and two for her
second unit of need), plus one for B-F. There are eight units of weighted need total.
If the institution gives one unit to A, this is the situation:

ABCDEFGHI J K
A-F each have one unit of need left for a total of six units of weighted need. If, instead,
the institution gives one unit to B-F the result is this:

A B C D E FG H I J K
Three units of weighted need remain in this situation. Again, three is less than six. It is
clear that action two is better than action one even before we take into account the fact
that more people are helped by doing action two.
Action two is always required by the effectiveness principle we are considering.
A different way of cashing out the principle might suggest doing action one in all
situations. But, no matter how it is cashed out, the effectiveness principle avoids Miller’s
problem. It will never entail that whose needs institutions should meet depends on how
many people are already able to meet their needs. I leave it to the reader to verify that the
effectiveness principle also avoids the leveling down objection.
hassoun@andrew.cmu.edu
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